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Bioethics with a Human Facet
CARL E. SCHNEIDER*

Perhaps in ethics, the true route begins with practice, with
deeds and doers, and moves only secondarily to reflection on
practice.... Moreover, because this sort of philosophical
reflection mirrors genuine conduct, ethics would not become
wholly or purely abstract, would never reach to what we call
ethical theory, because it would retain its connection with the
concreteness and complexities of the moral life and the moral
agent.
Leon R. Kass
PracticingEthics

What matters a great deal more is the fact that it was flimsily
based, as I now think, on an a priori view of what human
nature is like, both other people's and our own, which was
disastrously mistaken.
John Maynard Keynes
My Early Beliefs

This Article and the successor article I will shortly publish grow out of one
reaction I have had to years of reading bioethical and legal literature.' Let me
begin by putting the point in its simplest, even crudest, form: That literature
too often discusses the problems of health care in so disembodied and
denatured a way that the patients and physicians, the family and friends, the
dread and the disease are quite abstracted from the scene. The result is a
literature that critically limits itself and that crucially oversimplifies the issues
it confronts.

t © 1994 by Carl E. Schneider. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
This Article began in a paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Poynter Center and the
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Other versions of that paper were presented at the
Fifth Annual Bioethics Summer Retreat, at the Program for Society and Medicine, University of
Michigan Medical School, and at a faculty workshop at the Arizona State University Law School. I am
grateful to audiences at all these venues for their attentive and acute comments. I particularly benefitted
from the illuminating responses to the paper I gave at the Indiana University symposium of Bernice H.
Pescosolido and Peter Cherbas. I am also glad to be able to thank Ren6e R. Anspach, Alfred F. Conard,
Joel Howell, Stanton D. Krauss, James Lindeman Nelson, Martin Pernick, Carl J. Schneider, Dorothy
Schneider, Joan NV.Schneider, and Carol Weisbrod for their perceptive and penetrating comments on
earlier drafts of this manuscript. Finally, I am especially indebted to my colleagues and collaborators,
Patricia D. White and Lee E. Teitelbaum, not just for their characteristically generous and thoughtful
comments on this paper, but also for the ideas-too numerous and too integral to credit individually-which they have contributed to it. As they know, much in this paper grew out of the empirical
project in which we are jointly engaged on how patients make medical decisions and out of our many
conversations on these disturbing and absorbing topics.
1. In the highly interdisciplinary (or perhaps only motley) field of bioethics, it can be useful to
confess one's disciplinary background. I write from the perspective of the academic lawyer.
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There are, of course, reasons bioethical and even legal literature might tend
to abstract people from its problems. Bioethics is, in part, a subset of ethics,
and it is, in part, peopled by philosophers. It is a field and those are scholars
whose special calling is to undertake abstract analyses of human dilemmas.
And as Brody observes, the prominent analytic tradition in philosophy "has
been powerful in condemning anecdotal or ad hoc reasoning as hopelessly
subjective or intuitionistic and in insisting that reason in ethics requires that
conclusions be logically deduced from more general principles."2 Compounding this attention to the abstract is the philosopher's absorption with the
normative, his desire, as James L. Nelson puts it, "not to ask what people
want, as much as it is to ask what they should want."3
But even the abstract analysis of human problems cannot safely become too
far detached from the reality of those problems, from the insistent complexity
of human life. Further, bioethics, to say nothing of law, is also very much the
study of applied ethics, and its practitioners include people-like doctors,
lawyers, and ethicists employed by hospitals-who must be as concerned with
empirics as ethics.4
Yet another force helps explain why the literature of bioethics and law has
tended toward the abstract. Historically, bioethics has been vitally driven by
a desire to tame the imperialism and arrogance of medicine. As is common
in political battles, simple and forceful statements have worked better than
complex and guarded ones. More specifically, a powerfully stated and
too-often simple autonomy paradigm has become the central feature of
bioethical thought and law. Yet, despite the undoubted and true importance
of that paradigm, its reiteration has become stale, flat, and unprofitable, and
its simplicities have become too costly.
Thus, in this Article, I try first to describe the "hyper-rationalism" of
bioethics and of the law regulating the relationship between doctor and patient
and then offer one way to treat that ailment. Hyper-rationalism is the tendency
to believe, first, that people behave in ways that can so far be predicted a
priorithat empirical evidence about their behavior is superfluous and, second,
that people think and act rationalistically, seeking always to maximize and
exercise autonomy. Hyper-rationalism has contributed regrettably to a
simplifying of bioethical and legal thought, to treating people as though they
want essentially the same kinds of things and go about getting them in

2. HOWARD BRODY, STORIES OF SICKNESS 144 (1987).
3. Private communication.
4. And so some of them have been, sometimes and to some extent. For instance, a standard
introduction to bioethics-TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (3d ed. 1989)-cites some of the leading empirical studies and provides a generous sampling
of case studies. The problem of informed consent has produced particular attention to the empirical
aspects of a bioethical problem. See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379 (1990); Alan
Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an InformedDiscussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique
of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1983).
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essentially the same kinds of ways, to a view that human behavior is
characterized by a predominantly logical approach to life's perplexities.
At this stage in the history of bioethics and law, we should be ready, and
we surely need, to see the core problems of bioethics in all the factual and
moral complexity of reality. I will argue that empirical research provides one
useful way to bring more of that complexity back in. To illustrate concretely
the usefulness of such research I will describe a literature which provocatively
indicates that a substantial number of patients do not wish to make their own
medical decisions. I will suggest that this literature raises questions that
should cause us to think more deeply, rigorously, and richly about the
problems of bioethics in general and about its autonomy paradigm in
particular. Indeed, so fruitful are this literature and those questions that they
cannot be cabined within a single article. Thus I will explore them at length
in a subsequent piece.
I. STATING THE PROBLEM
[The rationalist] does not neglect experience, but he often appears to do so
because ... of the rapidity with which he reduces the tangle and variety
of experience to a set of principles which he will then attack or defend
only upon rational grounds. He has no sense of the cumulation of
experience, only of the readiness of experience when it has been converted
into a formula ....
Michael Oakeshott
Rationalism in Politics
It is no doubt true that you cannot get from is to ought. But you ought to
know what is is before you say what ought ought to be. And many of us who
write about bioethics can have only a faint sense of what that is is. Most of
us are not doctors.' All of us are patients, but few of us are unfortunate
enough to have wide personal dealings with doctors and hospitals. All of
us-doctors, patients, lawyers, and ethicists-have readily to hand only our
own limited and thus misleading experiences.
Bioethicists, like lawyers, constantly confront the danger of what I once
called "hyper-rationalism." 6 Hyper-rationalism has both a methodological and
a substantive aspect. In its former aspect, "[h]yper-rationalism is essentially
the substitution of reason for information and analysis. It has two components:
first, the belief that reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence
is unavailable or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts
through a [narrow] set of artificial analytic categories." 7 Hyper-rationalism,

5. And doctors seem curiously committed to an anecdotal approach to social and ethical issues.
DAvID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS
TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 7 (1991).

6. Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom andLegitimacy in Family Policy, 84 MICH.
L. REv. 919, 932-37 (1986).
7. Id. at 932. As Fox says of bioethics:
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in other words, tempts us to believe that we can understand how people think
and act merely by reasoning, and not by investigating. Hyper-rationalism

seductively justifies discussing human behavior without doing the empirical
work necessary to discover how people actually behave. Hyper-rationalism is
the conceptualist's revenge for the world's complexity.
Methodological hyper-rationalism, I have said, offers a rationale for a way
of understanding and writing about social problems. Substantive hyperrationalism furnishes the assumptions about how people think and act that
stand in for the information that might be garnered from empirical work. In
bioethics, as in many other areas of human thought,' these assumptions see
people as operating in highly rationalistic ways. They hold that people
deliberate explicitly about their situations, that they do so in predominantly
rational terms, that they are autonomy maximizers, 9 and that they have wellworked-out agendas which they need autonomy to maximize. The hyperrationalists' assumptions further see people primarily as makers of decisions,
reaching out for control over their lives.'" Finally, while they do not always
entirely abstract people from the social settings in which they live, they tend

to simplify those settings radically."
Combined, the assumptions of hyper-rationalism conduce to a view of
human nature that airbrushes out life's complexity and that sees human nature
and conduct as verging on the uniform. As Brody observes, "Some statements
in the medical ethics literature suggest that there is basically one way to be
sick, that sickness affects all sick individuals in this one way, and that

(O]rdered, cerebral armchair inquiry is given precedence, partly because the formalistic "data"
it generates more closely fit the norms of bioethical logic and rationality than information
gathered through first-hand research. Thought experiments are one of an ary of cognitive
techniques used in bioethics to distance and abstract itself from the human settings in which
ethical questions are embedded and experienced, reduce their complexity and ambiguity, limit
the number and kinds of morally relevant factors to be dealt with, dispel dilemmas, and siphon
off the emotion, suffering, bewilderment, and tragedy that many medical moral predicaments
entail for patients, families, and medical professionals.
Ren6e C. Fox & Judith P. Swazey, Medical Morality Is Not Bioethics, in ESSAYS IN MEDICAL
SOCIOLOGY 645, 666 (1988). Or as one distinguished bioethicist observes, "[I]n the fields of medical
ethics and bioethics, the theoretical views of Kant, Mill, and others are often invoked to give answers
to clinical problems that the principles' abstract formulations cannot provide." JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 107 (1984).
8. Economics, of course, comes immediately but not exclusively to mind. For a sustained criticism
of this aspect of social science thinking, see AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW
ECONOMICS (1988).
9. As the anthropologist Robert Murphy puts it, "The problems of dependence versus
independence, of contingency versus autonomy, are not restricted to American culture-they are a
universal aspect of all social relationships. The ability to survive on one's own and to maximize selfdetermination are essential ingredients of the basic drive to live." ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BODY
SILENT 202 (1990).
10. Etzioni associates this attitude with the "undersocialized view." That view "is closely linked to
the enlightenment notion, which is very sanguine about an individual's ability to reason. It assumes that
people set their own goals, in neatly patterned ways, and the ways they pursue their goals are open to
evidence and to inferences drawn logically ..
" ETZIONI, supra note 8, at 13.
11. For criticisms of law's hyper-rationality, see Carl E. Schneider, State-InterestAnalysis and the
Channeling Function in Privacy Law, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97 (Stephen E.
Gottlieb ed., 1993); Carl E. Schneider, State-InterestAnalysis in FourteenthAmendment "Privacy"Law:
An Essay on the Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1988).
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therefore one can usefully generalize, for ethical purposes, among all such
cases without inquiring too finely into the details." 2 Similarly, the law of
bioethics operates in capacious but undiscriminating categories. The duty of
informed consent, for example, applies by its terms to all but a few medical
decisions (those involving medical emergencies or patients who would be
injured by a disclosure). As Schuck writes, "[w]ith some relatively narrow
exceptions the law treats all patients and physicians the same; it posits an
abstracted, objectively defined 'prudent patient' as the consumer of information and the maker of choices, and conforms all physicians' legal obligations
to this uniform abstraction."' 3
Hyper-rationalism's assumptions also conduce to the view that patients
make decisions in highly rationalistic ways. Even some work in medical
sociology and social psychology is not immune from this defect. Thus Janis
writes:
The theoretical concepts that have been dominant in the literature on
decision making for over 25 years are based on cognitive theories, such as
'game theory' and 'subjective expected utility' (SEU) theory, which assume
that people make deliberate choices on a rational basis, taking account of
the values and the probabilities of the consequences to be expected from
choosing each of the available alternatives.' 4
As empiricists in fields ranging from sociology to psychology to anthropology
have been at pains to show, this view exaggerates human rationality and
understates the role of social and cultural factors in patients' lives. 5
If students of human behavior have too often succumbed to this consequence of hyper-rationalism, we should not be surprised to find lawyers and
bioethicists following suit. 6 Consider, for instance, how they seem to believe
people should and can make decisions. The AMA, for instance, has thought
that the "decision whether to permit or to perform a transplantation procedure
17
... must be a reasoned, intellectual decision, not an emotional decision."
Or, as one influential bioethicist writes, "Consent must be voluntary and

12. BRODY, supra note 2, at 144. He continues, "The extreme form of such a statement is something
like 'All illness representsa state of diminished autonomy"...."Id. (quoting M. S. Komrad, A Defence
of Medical Paternalism:Maximising Patients'Autonomy, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 38 (1983)).
13. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 957 (1994).
14. Irving L. Janis, The Patient asDecision Maker, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 326,
327 (%V.Doyle Gentry ed., 1984).
15. For an instructive survey of those criticisms, see Ronald C. Kessler et al., Social Psychology
and Health, in SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Karen Cook et al. eds., 1994).
For explorations of the limits on human rationality in making decisions, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL.,
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982). For an exploration of the emotional
context of human decisions, with special attention to the problems of medical patients, see IRVING L.
JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND
COMMITMENT 16 (1977). For a first-rate treatment of the social context of one kind of medical decision,
see Bernice A. Pescosolido, Beyond RationalChoice: The Social Dynamics of How People Seek Help,
97 AM. J. Soc. 1096, 1106-07 (1992).
16. For a particularly good examination of the tendency of modem bioethics to abstract problems
from their human and social reality and to think in hyper-rationalistic terms about them, see Leon IL
Kass, PracticingEthics: Where's the Action?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 5.
17. American Medical Association Judicial Council, Ethical Guidelinesfor Organ Transplantation
205 JAMA 341 (1968).
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free-the product of deliberative reflection on all possible courses of
action."' Or again, as two other influential bioethicists suggest, "Autonomy
requires that individuals critically assess their own values and preferences;
determine whether they are desirable; affirm, upon reflection, these values as
ones that should justify their actions; and then be free to initiate action to
realize the values."' 9
Hyper-rationalism's substantive assumptions could be true, but that has
hardly been demonstrated. And they are much likelier to be false. Their
picture of human nature is far too simple, far too disembodied to be
convincing. They present a bloodless, flat, distant, abstract, depersonalized,
impoverished view of the way people think, feel, and act, of the social
circumstances in which people live, of the ethical lives they lead. And hyperrationalism's simplifications are particularly injurious in bioethics, a field that
treats people in their least rational moments, in their most emotional travails,
in their most contextual complexity.
Hyper-rationalism, of course, has its uses. It promotes the kind of
generalization that frees courts and commentators to reason logically about the
normative problems that are, after all, one of their central concerns. And some
simplification of life's complexity is surely necessary if human problems are
to be handled practically and promptly, if comprehensible rules are to be
devised, if useful precedent is to be developed. But bioethicists and lawyers
should want to insinuate as much of that complexity as possible into their
normative discourse. A failure to do so perilously distances norms from the
people and circumstances they seek to govern and serve.
This is a peril with which law is all too familiar. Indeed, one of the most
illuminating bodies of modern legal writing is the scholarship which makes
sport of the idea (that seems so natural and right to lawyers and law
professors) that the law makes rules and that people know about them, accept
them, and respond to them in a considered and rational way. The seminal and
classic work in this sobering genre is Stewart Macaulay's Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy.20
Macaulay interviewed suppliers and purchasers in Wisconsin to see how
they used contracts and how the law of contracts influenced them. He found
that firms did not conceive of themselves as using contract law (even when,
in legal terms, they were) and that disputes were "frequently settled without
reference to the contract or potential or actual legal sanctions."'" Quite the
contrary, businessmen relied on their own system of norms and on informal
sanctions. As one of them crushingly said, "'You don't read legalistic contract
clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again. One doesn't run

18. Arthur L. Caplan, Informed Consent and Provider/PatientRelationships in Rehabilitation
Medicine, in IFI WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A PANCREAS? 240, 245 (1992).
19. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-PatientRelationship,
267 JAMA 2221, 2225 (1992).
20. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc.
REv. 36, 55 (1963).
21. Id. at 61.
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So far, I have made a general case that in our thinking about legal and
bioethical issues, we are prone to a hyper-rationalism that distorts our
understanding of reality'and that thus warps our normative thinking. I have
further argued that empirical research can help mend these defects. But the
best way of demonstrating the usefulness of the approach I advocate is by
example. Therefore, I will now briefly explore some of the hyper-rationalistic
assumptions on which the law of bioethics has relied. Then, I will draw
attention to a body of empirical data that raises provocative and stimulating
questions about those assumptions.
I begin with the centerpiece of bioethics-its autonomy paradigm.
"Paradigms," Kuhn suggests, "gain their status because they are more
successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of
practitioners has come to recognize as acute."" Bioethics was born out of
a crisis of imperialism in biomedical research and medical treatment.4 7 It is
thus unsurprising that, as Fox writes, "from the outset, the conceptual
framework of bioethics has accorded paramount status to the value-complex
of individualism, underscoring the principles of individual rights, autonomy,
self-determination, and their legal expression in the jurisprudential notion of
privacy."' 44 Even where the issue is the just allocation of scarce resources,
"[t]he view of distributive justice underlying it is structured around an
individual, rights-oriented conception of the general or common good, in
which greater importance is assigned to equity than to equality. 49
Of course, describing any field's paradigm is challenging, and bioethics'
paradigm is particularly elusive because that subject is compounded from
several diverse fields. Further, it is divided between "advocates" and
"academics" (although it is a passionate field, and sometimes one can scarcely
tell the two groups apart).50 As one might anticipate, the academics tend to
articulate the autonomy paradigm with greater sophistication, care, and
subtlety than the advocates." But "no important thought achieves social
power undegraded." 52 The intricate and somber refinement of a Freud is soon
46. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (1970). It is difficult for
a late twentieth-century academic to think about the development of a field of scholarship without
adverting to Kuhn's magisterial work. Perhaps that work applies better to scientific scholarship than to
scholarship in other fields. Perhaps it applies with some awkwardness to a field simultaneously as deeply
theoretical and as frankly practical as bioethics. Perhaps it does not even satisfactorily describe all
scientific work. But it has enormous resonance, and it will prove a useful point of embarkation. For a
recent survey of Kuhn's work, see PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE, RECONSTRUCTING SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS: THOMAS S. KUHN's PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1993).
47. For the story of the origins of bioethics, see DAVID J. ROTHMAN,STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE:
A HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991).

48. Fox, supra note 42, at 206.
49. Id.
50. On this division, see Daniel Wilder, What Has Bioethics to Offer Health Policy?, 69 MILBANK
Q. 233 (1991).
51. For example, Beauchamp and Childress labor to make it clear that there is more to bioethics
than the autonomy paradigm. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 4.
52. Carl E. Schneider, MoralDiscourseand the TransformationofAmerican FamilyLaw, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1803, 1846 (1985).
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transmuted into the remissive banalities of psychobabble5 The cautious
complexities of constitutional rights doctrine are readily debased into
arguments that professional baseball players have a constitutional right to
chew tobacco while playing ball. Thus the advocate's blunter versions are in
some ways the more consequential formulations of the paradigm, since it is
they that dominate the world in which medical policies are formulated and
social decisions are made and which are likeliest to beguile the public mind.
In any event, there is no doubt about the triumph of the autonomy
paradigm. As Caplan observes, "there are relatively few bioethicists who
argue that respect for autonomy is not the preeminent value governing the
actions of health-care providers. 5 ' He continues colorfully,
The Freddy Kruger of bioethics for the better part of two decades has been the
doctor who pushes his or her values onto the patient ....This devil has been
completely exorcised and a large part of contemporary bioethics scholarship seems
to be devoted to the task of assuring that the paternalistic doctor stays dead and
buried ......
It is perfectly true that in that most canonical expression of bioethic's
paradigms-what is jocularly called the Georgetown mantra-other considerations are recited. However, it is abundantly plain which principle predominates: And now abideth beneficence, social justice, and autonomy, these three;
but the greatest of these is autonomy. Thus, Fox observes that even the
"benefiting of others advocated in bioethical thought is circumscribed by
respectful deference to individual rights, interests, and autonomy; and
minimizing the harm done to individuals is more greatly
accentuated than the
56
maximization of either personal or collective good.
In my own field-the law governing medicine-it has been said that
"Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going selfdetermination.
Certainly autonomy has enjoyed an increasingly expansive
role in that law during the life span of bioethics. The doctrine of informed
consent, it is worth remembering, is essentially an innovation of the last three
decades. 8 In recent years, numerous state legislatures have labored to
enhance patients' autonomy by authorizing various kinds of advance
directives. Similarly, Congress a few years ago enacted the Patient Self
Determination Act, which basically requires hospitals and nursing homes to
53. See, e.g., PHILIP RIEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST (1979); PHILIP RIEFF, THE
TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD (1966).
54. See, e.g., Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 257.
55. Id. at 259.
56. Fox, supra note 42, at 206-07.
57. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
58. For a somewhat tendentious history of that doctrine, see KATZ,supra note 7, at 41-84. For a
well informed and more complex view of that history, see Martin S. Pemick, The Patient'sRole in
Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMIPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE

PATIENT-PRACrmONER RELATIONSHIP (3 President's Comm. for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982) [hereinafter President's Comm.].
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to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one must behave decently.,"22
Another illuminating study reaching much the same kind of conclusion
about the relevance of law's assumptions and forms to people's lives is
Robert C. Ellickson's striking study of ranchers and farmers in Shasta County,
California.' Ellickson set out to test the Coase Theorem's principle that
people will reach an economically efficient solution to their disputes whatever
the law's allocation of tort liability. Ellickson found that the allocation of
liability actually does not matter when wandering cattle damage a farmer's
crops, but not because people bargain to achieve economic efficiency. Rather,
disputes are generally avoided in the service of an informally accepted norm
of neighborliness and reciprocity, a norm enforced by the community's own
homemade informal sanctions.24
In short, a chastening literature "reveals that, to the lawyer's chagrin,
businesses resist using contracts, ranchers do not know what rules of liability
govern damage done by wandering cattle, suburbanites do not summon the
lawv to resolve neighborhood disputes, engaged couples do not know the law
governing how they will own property when they marry, citizens repeatedly
reject the due process protections proffered them, and, what is worse, all these
people simply don't care what the law says."2 This literature vividly
demonstrates the perils of the hyper-rationalist approach even in areas like
commercial life, which might be thought safe places to apply it.
The law regulating medicine abounds in its own examples of this provoking
phenomenon. For example, the law's principal bioethical reforms have been
used far less than their advocates anticipated and hoped. Caplan reports, for
instance, "No more than 10 percent of the population has either a living will
or a durable power of attorney. "26 He adds, "Similarly dismal statistics are
reported for the practices surrounding the issuance of DNR (do-not-resuscitate), DNI (do-not-intubate), and DNT (do-not-treat) orders in hospitals and
nursing homes. '27 Thus one study found that "the enactment of DNR
legislation in the State of New York appears to have had little effect on the
frequency of CPR and on the degree of patient or family involvement in the

22. Id.
23. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
24. Id. For further accounts and analyses of this literature, see ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985); Lynn A. Baker &
Robert E. Emery, When Every RelationshipIs Above Average: Perceptionsand ExpectationsofDivorce
at the Time ofMarriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 439 (1993); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children:
Wisdom andLegitimacy in Family Policy, 84 MICH.L. REV. 919 (1986); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking
Alimony: MaritalDecisionsand MoralDiscourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 197,203-09; Carl E. Schneider,
Social Structure and Social Control: On the Moral Orderof a Suburb, 24 L. & Soc. REv. 875 (1990).
25. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics in the Language ofthe Law, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (forthcoming
1994).
26. Arthur L. Caplan, Can Autonomy Be Saved?, in IFI WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A
PANCREAS? 256, 261 (1992) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Can Autonomy Be Saved?].
27. Id.
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DNR decision at our institution."" Caplan also argues that the experiment
of organ-donor cards "has been a failure," since despite the nearly universal
provision of a donor form on the back of one's driver's license, "no more
than 20 percent of all Americans have signed it."29 And Caplan reviews a
number of studies that "indicate that despite the enactment of legislation in
forty-four states requiring requests to be made of family members about organ
and tissue donation when someone dies in a hospital setting, more than a third
of all0 hospitals never do so, and an even larger number do so only sporadical3
ly."
Similarly, there is evidence that, despite the love and labor that have been
poured into it, the law of informed consent rarely results in significant
verdicts for plaintiffs, since "few patients sue physicians in general, even
fewer sue claiming lack of informed consent, and yet fewer prevail on that
theory.' One prominent scholar concludes glumly that that law "has had
little impact on patients' decision-making either in legal theory or medical
practice. 3 2 Some substantiation of this lies in the fact that "the empirical
and anecdotal studies of patients who refuse treatment almost never portray
33
the process of obtaining informed consent as playing a causative role.
A disjunction between the law's assumptions and the realities of practice
may be seen in yet other areas of medical law. Frequent and menacing though
tort suits may seem to doctors, "for every 8 potentially valid claims, only 1
claim [is] actually filed. 3s4 Indeed, "[e]ven when we narrowed our focus to
the more serious and 'valuable' tort claims-iatrogenic injuries to patients
under seventy that produced disabilities (including death) lasting six months
or more-we still found that for every 3 such events there was only 1 tort
payment. ' 3' Finally, there is (perhaps reassuring) evidence that "the exismade no difference to the willingness of
tence of Good Samaritan legislation
'3
physicians to stop and assist. 1
This literature, then, should alert us to the dangers of hyper-rationalism, to
the perils of believing unaided ratiocination can allow us to understand how
people conceive of their problems, organize their lives, resolve their disputes,
and respond to legal norms. But what is the antidote to hyper-rationalism?
There are several. For instance, Brody writes that philosophy of medicine
"can indeed advance by ... abstract discussions; but it can advance only so

28. Russell S. Kamer et al., Effect of New York State's Do-Not-Resuscitate Legislation on InHospital CardiopulmonaryResuscitation Practice, 88 AM. J. MED. 108, 109-10 (1990).
29. Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 262-63.
30. Id. at 265.
31. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 46.

32. Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT: L. REV. 137, 139(1977).
33. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 202.
34. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 13 (1991).
35. Id.
36. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATEIALS AND PROBLEMS 187 (2d ed.
1991). I do not mean to suggest that it is only lawyers who see the world through distorting lenses. For
an examination of the misperceptions doctors often have of the law, see Marshall B. Kapp & Bernard
Lo, Legal Perceptions and Medical Decision Making, 64 MILBANK Q. 163 (1986).
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far. At some point we will require a richer context for the discussion to
proceed fruitfully. This context can be provided by stories of sickness." 7
This attractive and profitable solution, of course, has its formal, wellestablished, and central counterparts. Casuistry is an ancient and still
honorable mode of ethical discourse.35 And cases lie at the very heart of our
common-law and constitutional method. But necessary though those methods
surely are, they are not by themselves sufficient. Too much depends on the
way the case is selected for study, on the richness of the problems the case
presents, on the amount of information that can be obtained about it. And
ultimately, a single case, or even a few cases, must be unrepresentative of the
sweep of cases the world invariably spawns.
We need, then, to inhabit all the mansions available in the house of
bioethics. And among the most deserted of those mansions is that of empirical
research. Judicial opinions dealing with bioethical issues rarely deal
thoroughly with empirical evidence, or even with what effect judicial
doctrines have. As Schuck notes, for example, "the cases evince little
systematic judicial interest in the [informed consent] doctrine's actual
consequences, especially its costs. Instead, courts tend to invoke the values
of autonomy and improved decisionmaking and then analyze the implications
of those values . . . ."" Similarly, "[i]n Tarasoff [v. Regents of the University of California40 ], as in other well known tort decisions, a court announced
a rule designed to change private behavior without reliable data regarding the
practices it was intending to change, the extent of the problem it was trying
to remedy, or the costs which the proposed cure would impose."4 1 Commentators are perhaps less prone to this failing, but it is still easy to find lengthy
articles, to say nothing of books, on bioethical issues which are unbesmirched
by data.
Yet such research offers a breadth, rigor, and precision of understanding
that is available in no other way. It provides a disciplined way of reviewing
our assumptions and a systematic means of identifying neglected issues. In
sum, empirical research provides a fruitful means of winning a more detailed,
complex, and accurate picture of what patients want, think, and do which can
deepen-and darken-our understanding of bioethical problems.4 2
All this being said, let me be the first to acknowledge the inevitable and
substantial difficulty of drawing solid conclusions about the psychological and

37. BRODY, supra note 2, at x. For further ruminations of the centrality of stories in medicine, see,
e.g., KATHRYN HUNTER, DocTORs' STORIES: THE NARRATIvE STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE

(1991).
38. For a helpful recent discussion of that tradition in the bioethical context, see John D. Arras,
GettingDown to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics, 16 J. MED. PHIL. 29 (1991).
39. Schuck, supra note 13, at 939.
40. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
41. Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of PrivateLaw in
Action, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 443, 444 (footnote omitted).
42. For an extended description of the distance between bioethics and the social sciences, see Ren6e
C. Fox, The Evolution of American Bioethics: A Sociological Perspective, in SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL ETHICS 201 (George Weisz ed., 1990).
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social reality of bioethical problems from the empirical evidence that is

currently available. 43 Empirical work relating to bioethics has all too

frequently been poorly planned and performed. It has often been designed to
test quite narrow questions, and those questions have not always been the
ones most urgent to bioethicists. That work has not developed according to

any larger plan, but has been done in response to a smorgasbord of discrete
problems in a hodgepodge of fields extending from law to sociology and
psychology to clinical medicine. Further, given the variety of medical
decisions that are made, the variety of contexts in which they occur, and the

variety of people who make them, it is all too likely that a study of one
situation will be a poor guide to others. Empirical work of this kind is also
time-bound, a particularly acute problem in an era and in areas as marked by
fulminant change as today's medicine, bioethics, law, and society. Finally,
because life is complicated and research is confoundingly difficult, even
relevant and ably done studies can produce results that bafflingly conflict with
the conclusions of other competently done research."
But I do not want to concede too much. Good empirical research into
bioethical issues is being done.45 And it is better to have some information
than none: Ultimately, we are wiser to use the best empirical evidence we can
muster than idly to rely on unexamined assumptions about an uncertain
reality. In any event, in this Article I am proposing that we should use these
empirical data not so much as infallible guides to what happens, but to

introduce more of the world's complexity into our thinking, both for present
consideration and future research.

II. HYPER-RATIONALISM AND AUTONOMISM IN BIOETHICS AND LAW
Truth is never pure and seldom simple.

Oscar Wilde
The Importance of Being Earnest

43. Indeed, it is always difficult to find adequately reliable empirical evidence and to draw useful
conclusions from it, as a massive literature attests. For a brief but knowledgeable introduction to that
literature, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1979).

44. For an example of such a result, see Debra L. Roter & Judith A. Hall, Studies ofDoctor-Patient
Interaction, 10 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 163 (1989). See Meisel & Roth, supra note 4, at 265, for a
relentless demonstration of the problems with empirical research in many kinds of bioethical problems.
45. Recent monographic examples include, but are not limited to, RENtE ANSPACH, DECIDING WHO
LIVES: FATEFUL CHOICES IN THE INTENSIVE CARE NURSERY 36 (1993); CHARLES L. BOsK, ALL GOD's"
MISTAKES: GENETIC COUNSELING IN A PEDIATRIC HOSPITAL (1992); ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE
CARE: MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION (1992). Janis concludes that "a substantial
number of studies can now be drawn upon to provide promising leads for explaining health-related
behavior and for developing practical applications...
Janis, supra note 14, at 343. Anspach and
Zussman provide illuminating apologias for the usefulness of social science in bioethics; Bosk presents
somewhat more guarded reflections on the same topic. Robert A. Pearlman et al., Contributions of
EmpiricalResearchto MedicalEthics, 14 THEORETICAL MED. 197 (1993), shows how specific empirical
studies have promoted discussion of some specific ethical issues. More broadly, see also Fox, supra note
42, at 206.
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give their clients an opportunity to make advance directives. 59 In a long
series of cases posing the question when medical treatment may be withdrawn,
state courts have generally striven to effectuate the supposed desires of the
patient. Even Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,60 which
has been assailed as curtailing rights of autonomy, can be understood as quite
compatible with them. In that case, for instance, the Supreme Court

unanimously endorsed the proposition that patients have some kind of
constitutional status in making medical decisions.6 And the majority's
holding was essentially based not on the absence of Cruzan's autonomy rights,
but on the presence of reasonable doubts about how she might have wished

to exercise them.62

In the particular area of bioethics to which this Article is directed-that is,
medical decision-making-patient autonomy is strongly the dominant
paradigm.6 3 In "contemporary medical ethics,.. . engaging the patient as an
active participant in medical decision making is seen as particularly
important,"' and "[i]n recent decades there has been a call for greater
patient autonomy or, as some have called it, 'patient sovereignty,' conceived
as patient choice and control over medical decisions. 65 Unfortunately, most
bioethicists have been thoroughly (if understandably) vague about the precise
nature and scope of that autonomy, about how it should be used, and about

59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(cc)(f), 1396(a)(w). In addition, of course, many public and private healthcare providers have written rules (governing DNR orders, for example) and established programs (ethics
committees, for instance), intended at least partly to protect patients' autonomy.
60. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). For some sound views of the constitutional issues in the case,
see Yale Kamisar, Right to Die? When Is There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REv.
1203 (1991); John Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisionsfor
Incompetent Patients,25 GA. L. REv. 1139 (1991). I analyze the case in Carl E. Schneider, Cruzan and
the Constitutionalizationof American Life, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 589 (1992).
61. As the Court put it, "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment .... Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
62. I do not mean to suggest that the law has failed to recognize some of the important reasons
patient autonomy must be limited. For a helpful and refreshing argument that "autonomy does not seem
to be as dominant a value as rhetoric would suggest," see Roger B. Dworkin, MedicalLaw and Ethics
in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.. 727, 728 (1993).
63. I am referring here, of course, to what bioethicists and lawyers say, not to what doctors do.
What doctors have historically done differs markedly from what bioethicists would now have them do.
But there is some evidence of notable changes in what doctors do. Zussman, for instance, reports that
"the notion of rights in medicine ...has.., become part of the culture of medicine itself." ZUSSMAN,
supranote 45, at 85. He concludes that the "notion of rights as a broad cultural concept (the acceptance
of which is among the indirect effects of the legal doctrine) has had far-reaching consequences,
including, most important, an empowerment of the patient ... "Id. at 81. Caplan notes that "[d]octors
and nurses report in survey after survey that they support the concept of advance directives .... Can
Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 261. For a less sanguine evaluation of changes in attitudes
toward patient autonomy in decisions to terminate treatment, see David Orentlicher, The Illusion of
Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992). He believes that a "reasonable
argument can be made that professional resistance to patient autonomy has so far prevailed and that
changes in the treatment of the dying reflect changes in physician attitudes more than changes in the
way end-of-life decisions are made." Id. at 2103.
64. Lachlan Forrow et al., Science, Ethics, and the Making of ClinicalDecisions, 259 JAMA 3161,
3166 (1988).
65. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 19, at 2223 (emphases in original) (citation omitted).
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how doctors and patients are to put the principle into practice.66 However,
the standard view broadly makes the physician the proposer and the patient
the disposer. Brock provides a particularly lucid, measured, and moderate
statement of that view:
Most simply put, the physician's role is to use his or her training,
knowledge, and experience to provide the patient with facts about the
diagnosis and about the prognoses without treatment and with alternative
treatments. The patient's role in this division of labor is to provide the
values-his or her own conception of the good-with which to evaluate
these alternatives, and to select the one that is best for himself or
herself.6 7
Further, bioethicists generally unite in wanting the patient's choice to be
autonomous in quite a strong sense of that term. Thus, for example,
Beauchamp and Childress look for a decision in which "a patient or subject
with substantial understandingand in substantial absence68of control by others
intentionally authorizes a professional to do something."
This standard view of the centrality of patient autonomy and its predominance in medical decisions is enacted into law in the doctrine of informed
consent. 69 That doctrine assumes that "it is the prerogative of the patient, not
the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests
seem to lie."7 ° Medical decisions may only be made with the patient's
consent. Once again, consent is intended in a strong sense: "True consent to
what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each.'
It is the goal of the doctrine of informed
consent to secure "the patient's right of self-determination on [a] particular
therapy"72 and to "enable the patient to chart his course understandably" by

66. Instead of precision, readers ofbioethical writing must often settle for such uninformative terms
as "shared," or "collaborative," or "participatory." The Emanuels have made a step in the right direction
by flying to construct ideal types of medical decisions. Id. at 2221. They identify a "paternalistic" model
in which the doctor decides what is best, subject to the patient's assent; an "informative" model in
which the doctor presents information to the patient and the patient makes the decision; an "interpretive"
model in which the doctor's job is to help patients discover what they want and how best to get it; and
a "deliberative" model in which doctors work with patients to "help the patient determine and choose
the best health-related values that can be realized in the clinical situation." Id. at 2221-22. While the
Emanuels do little to identify proponents of these models, they do conclude that there has been a "shift
toward the informative model." Id. at 2223.
67. Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Patients, 1
KENNEDY INST. ETHIcs J. 28, 28 (1991). Brock's own views on the subject are engaging and well worth
reading. For similar descriptions of how medical decisions ought to be made, see, e.g., Richard Sherlock,
Reasonable Men and Sick Human Beings, 80 AM. J. MED. 2, 2 (1986). One of the standard internal
medicine textbooks speaks of"a more equal relationship of shared decision making in which physicians
provide information and counseling that allows competent adult patients to make their own choices."
Mark Siegler & Peter A. Singer, ClinicalEthics, in 1 TEXTBOOK OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 3, 4 (William
N. Kelley ed., 2d ed. 1992).
68. BEAUCHAMp & CHILDRESS, supra note 4, at 76 (emphases in original).
69. For an imposing list of articles to this effect, see Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent
to Patient Choice: A New ProtectedInterest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 226 n.30 (1985).
70. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 780 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 784 (citation omitted).
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assuring him some "familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their
hazards."'73
The reaction of commentators to the law of informed consent confirms the
elevated status of the autonomy paradigm and the high hopes autonomists
have for patient participation in medical decisions. The conventional wisdom
is that that law is wretchedly inadequate to its vocation of promoting patients'
autonomy. Katz, for instance, calls that law "largely a charade"'74 that is
"substantially mythic and fairy tale-like as far as advancing patients' rights
to self-decisionmaking is concerned" and that "only has made a bow toward
a commitment to patients' self-determination." 75 Appelbaum, Lidz, and
Meisel call informed consent "a doctrine and a set of practices that compromise all values and satisfy none in their entirety."76 Shultz is one of many
who wish to broaden its scope largely. (She would require doctors to tell
patients not just about proposed treatments, but also about possible medical
inquiries the physician decides not to pursue.) 77 More generally, commentators widely believe that "[t]he rise of patients' rights, both in law and ethics,
instigated a revolution not yet completed,' 7 ' a "revolution in medical
relationships [which] remains incomplete and embattled, ' 79 a revolution in
which "[t]he struggle is to recognize patients' rights."8
In sum, the overwhelming weight of bioethical opinion thus endorses not
just the autonomy principle, but quite a potent version of it. The autonomy
paradigm continues to flourish, planted as it is in the fertile soil of American
rights thinking, anchored as it is by roots that run deep into the structure of
American law, and tended as it is by legions of votaries.8" That paradigm

73. Id. at 781 (citation omitted).
74. KATz, supra note 7, at 99.
75. Katz, supra note 32, at 174. Echoing Katz, Brennan writes that "doctors have consistently
sought to maximize their own paternalistic prerogatives. The notion of informed consent thus remains
a fairy tale." Troyen A. Brennan, Silent Decisions:Limits ofConsent and the Terminally IlI Patient,16
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 204, 204 (1988) (citation omitted).
76. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 130.
77. Shultz, supra note 69. For other criticisms of the doctrine of informed consent by legal
commentators, see, e.g., HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S PowER 83-119 (1992); Howard Brody,
Transparency:Informed Consentin PrimaryCare,HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 5; Jones,
supra note 4; Alan Meisel, A "DignitaryTort" as a Bridge Between the Idea ofInformed Consent and
the Law ofInformed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210 (1988).
78. Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees andDue Process:NestingRights in a Community of Caring,
50 MD. L. REV. 798, 824 (1991).
79. Id. at 857.
80. Id. at 855.
81. For a critical examination of the centrality of rights thinking in American politics, law, and life,
see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). For
an argument stressing that centrality, but arguing that inchoate alternatives yearn to break through, see
ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN
LIFE (1985). For a study of rights thinking at the intersection of bioethics and law, see Schneider, supra
note 60; and Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourseand NeonatalEuthanasia,76 CAL. L. REV. 151 (1988)
[hereinafter Rights Discourse]. For an examination of the role of rights in medical decisions, see
ZussMAN, supra note 45, at 81-97. Zussman believes that the "notion of rights" has "since about 1970,
become part of the culture of medicine itself." Id. at 85.
This emphasis on the distinctively American quality of the autonomy paradigm is not accidental.
There are few if any other countries in the world in which autonomy has assumed so powerful a position
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rests on the methodologically and substantively hyper-rationalistic assumption
that autonomy is what people primarily and pervasively want and need.
Correspondingly, the law of bioethics seems to assume that its principal task
is to remove impediments to the exercise of autonomy, that once those
impediments are removed, people will naturally gather evidence about the
risks and benefits of each medical choice, will apply that evidence to their
values, and will reach a considered and autonomous decision.
Nevertheless, we may now have reached a relatively late period in what
Kuhn might call the "normal science" of the autonomy paradigm. A large part
of bioethical thought in recent years has involved working out what
"autonomy" might mean. That work has produced the expected unexpected:
"Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when
successful, finds none. New and unsuspected phenomena are, however,
repeatedly uncovered by scientific research .... ."" This has now occurred
often enough in bioethics that a sense of dissatisfaction with the autonomy
paradigm is being expressed with increasing conviction and feeling. 3 We
may thus be reaching the stage when "[t]he proliferation of competing
articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit
discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals [mark]
a transition from normal to extraordinary research." 4
In this paper, then, I want to begin to identify a few of the anomalies and
discontents that have arisen out of the work of normal science under the
autonomy paradigm. I will do so by examining one challenging kind of
empirical evidence about how people actually think about their role in making
medical decisions. To that evidence we now turn.
III. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
To history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of
instructing the present for the benefit of future ages. To such
high offices this work does not aspire: It wants only to show
what actually happened.
Leopold von Ranke
Histories of the Latin and Teutonic Nations (1494-1514)
Given bioethics' autonomy paradigm and its hyper-rational premises-particularly its presumptions that people behave in generally similar

in thinking about the authority of the patient. And there are many countries-even highly industrialized
countries-where a very different paradigm presides.
82. KUHN, supra note 46, at 52.
83. Among the criticisms particularly noticed have been, for example, Daniel Callahan, Autonomy:
A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 40; Daniel Callahan,
Contemporary Biomedical Ethics, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1228 (1980); Willard Gaylin, Autonomy,
Paternalism,and Community, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 5; Robert M. Veatch, Autonomy's
Temporary Triumph, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 38. I have expressed my own discomforts
at misuses of the principle of autonomy in the law of bioethics in Rights Discourse, supra note 81.
84. KuHN, supra note 46, at 91.
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ways, that they seek to maximize their autonomy, and that they make
decisions by assembling all the relevant data and selecting the course that
optimizes the goals they have already developed-it is not surprising that
bioethicists and lawyers widely assume that patients want to seize and make
their own medical decisions.85 In light of these assumptions, perhaps some
of the most arresting empirical data so far accumulated are those which
suggest that a significant number of patients are reluctant to make such
decisions. Because this literature is complex and, to hyper-rationalists,
counter-intuitive, I will discuss several studies in some detail.
We begin with Ende and his colleagues. They presented 312 patients in a
primary-care clinic of a teaching hospital with vignettes representing various
levels of illness severity.16 "On a scale where 0 indicates a very low and 100
indicates a very high preference for decision making, and 50 indicates a
neutral attitude, the mean score for the study population was 33.2 ± 12.6.""
Thus, the authors concluded that "patients' preferences for decision making
in general were weak. Moreover, as patients were asked to consider
increasingly severe illnesses, their desires to make decisions themselves
declined."88 Like a number of other studies, this one found that younger
people were most likely to want to participate in decisions. More clearly than
other studies, this one concluded that higher education, higher occupational
status, and being divorced or separated were also associated with such a
desire. However, these factors accounted for only 19% of the variation among
patients.
This study did very much resemble other studies in one consequential
respect: That patients were not avid to participate in decisions did not mean
that they did not want to be informed about what was going on. Quite the
contrary. Like patients in study after study, these patients widely said they
were anxious to be told about their medical situation. In fact, "the mean score
for information seeking was 79.5 ± 11.5. ' '89
Another striking study was conducted by Strull and his associates. They
studied 210 hypertension patients and their physicians in a community hospital
85. Katz, for example, writes, "I said more, althougli still not enough, about the prevalent assertion
that patients generally do not wish to share the burdens of decision and that they prefer instead to trust
their doctors' recommendations blindly. I doubt this assertion." KATZ, supranote 7, at 228. (Of course,
in the tendentious way Katz phrases this "prevalent assertion," it is indeed dubious. I too doubt that
patients want to trust their doctors "blindly.") The President's Commission comfortably concluded that
"the vast majority of people surveyed by the Commission felt that patients... ought to participate in
decisions regarding their health care." I President's Comm., supra note 58, at 17. For a more exact
description of these survey data, see infra text accompanying notes 117-19.
MeasuringPatients'DesireforAutonomy: Decision Making andInformation86. Jack Ende et al.,
Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 23, 23 (1989). "Upper

respiratory tract illness (URI) represented mild disease; hypertension (HBP), moderate disease; and
myocardial infarction (MI), severe or most threatening disease." Id.
87. Id. at 25. These results were confirmed in a study of the membership of an HMO. Suzanne C.
Thompson et al., Preferences for Involvement in Medical Decision Making: Situational and
Demographic Influences, 22 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING, 133 (1993).
88. Ende et al., supra note 86, at 26-27.
89. Id. at 26.
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clinic, an HMO, and a VA outpatient clinic. 90 Like the Ende group, they
found that patients wanted information. "Fifty-two percent of patients reported
that they had received 'quite a lot' of information or 'all there is to know'
about hypertension and its therapy from their current clinician."'" In
evaluating the information they had received, "[fjorty-one. percent of the
patients stated they would have preferred additional information, while 58%
received the 'right amount,' and only one patient preferred less informa'
tion."92
But much as the patients wanted to be informed they did not equivalently
want to participate in medical decisions:
[N]early half (47%) of patients preferred that the clinician make the
therapeutic decisions "using all that is known about the medicines" but •
without the patient's participation ....One third of the patients preferred
that the clinician make the decision "but strongly consider the patient's
opinion." Only 19% of the patients stated they wish to share equally with
the clinician in making the decision, and 3%wished to make the decision
themselves."93
Intriguingly, the doctors over-estimated their patients' desire to make medical
decisions: "In contrast to the patient preferences, in the large majority of
cases (78%) clinicians believed that patients wanted to help make decisions.
In only 22% of cases
did the clinician think the patient wanted the clinician
94
alone to decide.
The patients and physicians disagreed about how decisions were in fact
made.
Sixty-three percent of patients reported that the "clinician usually makes
the decision, using all that's known about the medicines," while clinicians
reported such decision making in only 20% of cases ....Only 37% of
patients, as opposed to 80% of clinicians, reported that the patient
participates to any extent in decisions.9
But whatever was happening was not making the patients unhappy. Eightynine percent of them "reported being 'very' or 'extremely' satisfied with their
overall medical care from their current clinician, and 84% reported a 'very'
or 'extremely' high degree of satisfaction with the way in which decisions
about their treatment are made." 96
Vertinsky and his collaborators also studied a population whose interest in
being informed exceeded their interest in controlling their treatment. 97 This

90. William M. Strull et al., Do Patients Want to Participatein Medical Decision Making?, 252

JAMA 2990 (1984).
91. Id. at 2991. The clinicians, however, "reported giving these amounts of information in only 38%
of cases." Id.
92. Id.

93. Id. at 2992 (quoting the language used on a questionnaire to patients).

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2993.
97. Ilan B. Vertinsky et al., .Measuring Consumer Desirefor Participationin ClinicalDecision
Making, 9 HEALTH SERV. RESEARCH 121 (1974).
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team surveyed two hundred randomly chosen residents of Vancouver and
asked them how they would react to a scenario in which a patient has a strep
throat and in which the doctor does not tell the patient all the risks of either
non-treatment or treatment. The factor that was least often chosen was
"patient decision," which was "defined in terms of preference for retaining the
final decision function in the patient's hands."98 Indeed, "[d]irect participation ('Patient Decision')... was rated as unimportant by almost all subjects,
although patients indicate rather strongly a desire to maintain some measure
of participation ('Avoidance' receiving markedly low scores). 99
Another study showing that a substantial number of patients are loath to
make their own medical decisions was conducted by Faden and her coworkers.' 00 They asked 53 seizure patients to choose between, on one hand,
having their doctor decide whether they needed medication and, if so, which
medication or, on the other hand, hearing the doctor's recommendation but
deciding whether to receive medication and which to take. The former course
was chosen by 44.2%, the latter by 55.8%.10° Thus while a majority of the
patients questioned preferred to make their own medical decision, a very large
minority rejected that approach. This result is particularly remarkable because
the patients studied (who were from Walter Reed Hospital) "could be
described as young, adult, married, white and fairly well educated,"'0 2 a
selection of people probably likeliest to want to make their own medical
decisions.
Beisecker studied 106 people "with a wide range of ailments and disabilities: recovering stroke patients, head trauma and other accident victims,
patients with sports injuries, amputees, and patients with severe arthritis,
chronic back pain, and muscle diseases such as muscular dystrophy" who
were patients of specialists in physical medicine and rehabilitation.' 3
Beisecker used a scale for measuring preferences about medical decisions on
which "belief in the patient as sole locus of decision-making authority would
yield a scale score of 26; belief in the doctor as the sole decision-maker
would yield a score of 0, and belief that all decisions should be made jointly
(or indicating that a doctor's decisions counterbalanced those which should

98. Id. at 128. This factor was comprised of statements like: "Ask the doctor to give him all the
information he has, and then the patient decides what to do." Id.
99. Id. at 133. Avoidance was "defined in terms of items indicating propensity to delegate the
decision function completely (0 'Just follow the doctor's orders and go home')." Id. at 128.
100. Ruth R. Faden et al., DisclosureofInformation to Patients in Medical Care, 19 MED. CARE 718
(1981).
101. What makes the study particularly interesting was that 93% of the neurologists interviewed
believed the doctor should make the choices. However here, as in a number of other efforts, the
usefulness of the study's results are impeded by the fact that its respondents were forced to choose
between only two options. Once again, too, the study reported extremely widespread interest in
information about available medications and their risks. Interestingly, though, the information the fewest
people wanted was the information about "drug-related mortality."
102. Faden et al., supra note 100, at 720.
103. Analee E. Beisecker, Aging and the Desirefor Information and Input in Medical Decisions:
Patient Consumerism in Medical Encounters,28 GERONTOLOGIST 330, 332 (1988).
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be made by the patient) would yield a score of 13. ' 4 The mean score for
Beisecker's medically diverse population was 8.6.
Mark and Spiro studied 102 outpatients scheduled to undergo a colonoscopy. "When asked, 'Which way would you prefer to come to a medical
decision?' 57 patients wanted to share the decision with the physician, 22
wanted to make their own decision, and 23 wanted the physician to make the
decision."'0 5 Asked about the decision to have a colonoscopy examination,
"53 patients said that they shared the decision with the physician, 40 patients
said that the physician was most responsible for the decision, and 9 patients
said that they were most responsible." Yet despite the apparent discrepancy
between how some patients said they wanted medical decisions to be made
and the way the colonoscopy decision was made, "only two patients declined
to say in the end that they had 'just the right amount of responsibility in
making the decision .... "1106
A study by Lidz and his collaborators of informed consent produced clearer
the patients
results. 0 7 They concluded that, "with a few exceptions ....
believed that decisions about their treatment should be primarily or completely
up to their physicians because of their technical expertise and commitment to
the best interests of the patients."'0 8 Again, patients did want information.
But "[o]nly about 10% of the patients we interviewed saw themselves as
having an active role in decision making."0 9
Also notable, if rather vaguely reported, is a study by Miller, et al., of 150
primary-care patients at a department of internal medicine. This study was
undertaken to evaluate the way different personality types respond to threats
to their health. It found that "almost no patients desired to have the final say
in their medical care" and that 36.5% of one personality type and 15.9% of
the other "desired to play a completely passive role in their own care."" 0
An illuminating perspective on the desire of patients to make medical
decisions comes from a study by Degner and Sloan, whose study compares the
attitudes of newly diagnosed cancer patients and a random sample of residents
of Winnipeg.'

104. Id.
105. Jennifer Susan Mark & Howard Spiro, Informed Consentfor Colonoscopy, 150 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MEDICINE 777, 777-78 (1990).

OF

106. Id. at 778.

107. Charles W. Lidz et al., Barriersto informed Consent, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 539 (1983).
One more impressionistic study of informed consent reported that the researcher's "period of observation
bore out that in many cases patients do request or allow physicians to make decisions for them." Jones,
supra note 4, at 419-20 (citation omitted).
108. Lidz et al., supra note 107, at 540.
109. Id. at 541.
110. Suzanne M. Miller et al., Styles of Coping with Threat: Implications for Health, 54 J.

142, 146 (1988). They found that 48.1% of the former personality type
("high monitors") and 71.4% of the latter ("low monitors") "preferred that treatment decisions be made
jointly by themselves and their physicians." Id.
111. Lesley F. Degner & Jeffrey A. Sloan, Decision Making DuringSerious Illness: What Role Do
Patients Really Want to Play?, 45 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 941 (1992).
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
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The majority of newly diagnosed patients (59%) preferred that physicians
make treatment decisions on their behalf. The most popular first choice of
patients was the statement, "I prefer that my doctor makes the final
decision about which treatment will be used, but seriously considers my
diagnosed patients preferred to play an active
opinion." Only 12% of newly
12
role in decision making.'
The residents of Winnipeg, in contrast, seemed more interested in such
participation. Sixty-four percent of them thought they would want to play an
active role in decision making if they were to develop cancer."
Another Canadian study questioned 52 cancer patients in early stages of
their disease." 4 Sixty-three percent of them "felt the physician should take
the primary responsibility in decision making, 27% felt it should be an equally
shared process, and 10% felt they should take a major role." ' Again, even
patients who expected their doctors to assume the primary responsibility for
medical decisions were interested in receiving information.
Another relevant study was conducted by Cassileth and company. 6 They
gave 256 cancer patients a choice between two statements: "I prefer to
participate in decisions about my medical care and treatment," and "I prefer
to leave decisions about my medical care and treatment up to my doctor."
Eighty-seven percent of those aged 20 - 39, 62% of those aged 40 - 59, and
51% of those over 60 chose the former statement.11 7 This is one of the most
frequently recruited citations for the proposition that patients want to make
medical decisions. Yet even it concludes that a substantial number of patients
are willing to subscribe to quite a strongly stated desire to cede authority to
their doctors. In addition, the reaction to this study typifies a common but
unfortunate response to empirical studies-to transform a finding that a
majority prefer something into the assertion that everyone wants it. As has
been well said, "In health index construction, in the evaluation of the
outcomes of clinical trials and in clinical decision analysis for groups of
patients the use of average preference scores runs the danger of 'the tyranny
of the majority': it essentially disregards the opinions of those whose scores
are removed from the mean." 8

112. Id. at 945-46.
113. Id. at 946. Once again, age was the best (though not a particularly strong) predictor of a
preference for participation in making decisions. Interestingly, "[tihe clinical hypothesis that patients
who are more ill prefer less control in cancer treatment decision making was not supported. Neither
symptom distress levels nor stage of disease were related to patients' role preferences." Id. at 947.
114. H.J. Sutherland et al., Cancer Patients: Their Desirefor Information and Participationin
TreatmentDecisions, 82 J. RoYAL Soc'Y MED. 260 (1989).
115. Id. at 262.
116. Barrie R. Cassileth et al., Information and ParticipationPreferencesAmong Cancer Patients,
92 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 832 (1980).
117. Id. at 834. Once again, the desire for information outweighed the desire for control: The parallel
assents to the statement "I want as much information as possible, good and bad" were 96%, 79%, and
80%. Id. at 833-34 (emphasis in original).
118. Health Services Research Group, Studying Patients' Preferences in Health Care Decision
Making, 147 CAN. MED. ASs'N . 859, 862 (1992).
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Furthermore, even those who chose the first of the two statements in the
Cassileth study were only asking for some-unspecified-level of participation in decisions. Some, and perhaps many, of those patients may have wanted
little more than to receive good information and to retain a veto power over
their doctor's decisions (although presumably others of them actually wanted
to make some decisions in some stronger sense). In addition, it seems likely
that the relatively great desire for participation this study reports is an artifact
of the maximally narrow range of choices the respondents were given. 9
Finally, there is the Louis Harris poll of doctors and the general public
undertaken for the President's Commission. 20 Seven percent of the public
wanted the doctor to present all the possible alternatives and to let the patient
decide. Twelve percent wanted the doctor to present a recommendation for the
patient to accept or reject. Seven percent wanted the doctor to decide what
should be done and to do it. Seventy-two percent thought the doctor should
discuss alternatives with the patient and that they should then decide together
what to do. Less than
half a percent thought the way to proceed depends on
21
the circumstances.
This is probably the strongest statement of a public desire to make medical
decisions. However, it is not easy to interpret. Most of the respondents wanted
the doctor and patient to decide together what to do, but it is most unclear
just how they envisioned the allocation of power between the doctor and
patient. For instance, Ende and his colleagues conclude that the Harris data
"seem to support the notion that patients prefer the model wherein the doctor
keeps the patient informed and engages the patient in the decision making
process, rather than having the patient function as the principal decision
maker." 22 It is at least significant that very few patients opted for the
response-having the doctor present alternatives for the patient's decision-that comes closest to Brock's formulation of the autonomy standard for
patients' decisions.
What, then, can we say of the studies of patients' desires to participate in
medical decisions? They certainly have their drawbacks. To begin with, they
119. For criticisms of this feature of the Cassileth study, see Degner & Sloan, supranote 111,
at 948;
Ende et al., supra note 86, at 27. Other studies have used the same two-alternatives question about
decision-making employed in the Cassileth study and have yielded relatively high desires to make
decisions, although still with substantial numbers preferring to avoid decisions. For example, one study
reported that 70% of their respondents wanted to participate in medical decisions. Mare D. Silverstein
et al., Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Life-Sustaining Therapy: Patients' Desiresfor Information,
Participationin Decision Making, and Life-Sustaining Therapy, 66 MAYo CLrmc PROC. 906, 908
(1991). Similarly, Christina G. Blanchard et al., Information and Decision-Making Preferences of
HospitalizedAdultCancerPatients,27 Soc. SCL. MED. 1139, 1143 (1988), found that "almost one-third

(30.5%) [of the cancer patients they interviewed] stated that they preferred to leave decisions about their
medical care and treatment up to their doctor."
120. Louis Harris & Associates, Views ofInformed Consent and Decisionmaking: ParallelSurveys
of Physicians and the Public, in 2 President's Comm., supra note 58, at 17.

121. Id. at 209. It is also notable that the worse the health of the respondents, the less likely they
were to want to make their own decisions.
122. Ende et al., supra note 86, at 27. For a useful attempt to demonstrate that all the studies
showing a higher desire for participation do not conflict with the conclusions of those studies showing
a lower desire, see id. at 27-28.
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generally used questions which were frustratingly inexact, so that we are
almost always left to guess precisely what allocation of authority the
respondents had in mind. Part of the problem here is due to the fact that all
the studies I have reviewed are quantitative surveys, not the kind of
qualitative, ethnographic research that might better yield more richly textured
information. Thus these studies do disappointingly little to dispel the haze of
imprecision veiling discussions of how authority should be allocated between
patient and doctor.
Further, there are reasons to have some qualms about the reliability of the
enterprise of asking people what role they want in medical decisions. People
will quite reasonably not always know what they want. These are, after all,
hard questions and questions about which many people will not have thought
much and about which people may change their minds with experience and
reflection. Indeed, these are questions about which people may reasonably be
primarily ambivalent. And even people who know what they want will often
have difficulty articulating their preferences. All these problems are at their
most acute when, as often occurred, studies ask people who are not sick to
speculate about how they would feel about medical decisions if they were
sick, or ask people who are sick about hypothetical variations on their illness.
Along these lines, it is tantalizing that none of the studies probes very far-if
at all-into the reasons people might have for wanting or rejecting medical
authority. That information might have helped us understand much more
accurately what patients truly want.
In addition, these studies do not adequately take into account the daunting
range of circumstances in which medical decisions are made. It will surely
matter how sick or healthy the patient is, how well the doctor and patient
know each other, how trivial or consequential the decision is, how technical
the issues raised, and so on. It will particularly matter where the decision falls
on the (somewhat artificial) continuum between purely medical decisions on
one hand and purely social or moral decisions on the other.
Nevertheless, these studies are the best evidence we have about peoples'
attitudes toward medical decisions. And I believe they are adequate to provide
a basis for thinking about those attitudes. Taken as a whole, these studies
surveyed a considerable variety of populations-from the perfectly well to the
dangerously sick. They asked patients about their own conditions and about
hypothetical illnesses. They framed their respondents' choices in a variety of
ways. And their virtually universal conclusion was that, while patients
commonly wish to be informed about their medical circumstances, at least a
quite substantial number of them did not want to make their own medical
decisions, or perhaps even to participate in those decisions in any very
significant way.
Another reason for taking these studies seriously is that their conclusions
about people's reluctance to seize control of their medical decisions find some
substantiation in several different kinds of evidence. Consider, first, the
reaction to the burgeoning availability of advance directives. In recent years,
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cases like Quinlan123 and Cruzan, 124 publicists like Jack Kevorkian, and
referenda like those in Washington and California have brought questions
about terminating life support to the fore of public discussion. Part of this
discussion has consisted of adjurations to sign advance directives. That people
should do so has become the conventional wisdom. Patients have forms thrust
upon them when they enter health-care facilities. Many lawyers routinely offer
to prepare advance directives when people come in for estate planning.
Despite all this, relatively few people have prepared advance directives, and
many people appear reluctant to discuss such matters even with their families
(to say nothing of their doctors). 25 There are, to be sure, a number of
reasons for this, not least that people are fearful and superstitious, that they
"prefer to avoid the subject of how to manage their own dying."' 126 But the
point is exactly that many people have strong reasons for not wanting to grasp
the nettle of autonomy.
Much more arresting is the evidence that people do not necessarily
contemplate that advance directives should necessarily be scrupulously
followed. In a study conducted by Sehgal and her colleagues, 150 dialysis
patients were asked "[w]hom they would want to help their physician make
decisions for them if they developed advanced Alzheimer's disease" and
"[h]ow much leeway their physician and surrogate should have to override
this advance directive if overriding were in their best interests."' 27 These
patients "varied greatly in how much leeway they would give their physician
and surrogate to override their advance directive if overriding were in their
best interests: 'no leeWay' (39%), 'a little leeway' (19%), 'a lot of leeway'
(11%), and 'complete leeway' (31%)."12 In brief, if people were as avid to
123. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
124. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
125. For instance, Caplan concludes that no more than 10% of the population has an advance
directive. Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 261. It appears that even those presumptively

most in need of advance directives prepare them with surprising infrequency. Thus one study found that,
while half of the 39 nursing home patients questioned had thought about end-of-life decisions, only 6
had actually signed advance directives. Eric L. Diamond et al., Decision-MakingAbility and Advance
Directive Preferences in Nursing Home Patients and Their Proxies, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 622 (1989).
One random survey of outpatients found that only 11% had discussed cardiopulmonary resuscitation
with their doctors, while 67% had thought of doing so. (Forty-four percent had discussed the issue with
someone else.) Mark H. Ebell et al., The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order: Outpatient Experience and
Decision-Making,31 J.FAM. PRAc. 630 (1990). Another study found that only 9% of its respondents
had discussed surrogate decision-makers with their doctors and that only 6% had discussed lifesustaining treatment. Bernard.Lo et al., PatientAttitudes to DiscussingLife-Sustaining Treatment, 146
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1613 (1986). For a review of studies suggesting that people rarely discuss
termination of treatment with either their families or their doctors, see Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L.
Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Patients,267 JAMA 2067, 2068-69 (1992).
126. Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 263. Caplan observes that there has been a similar
reluctance to sign organ-donor cards.
127. Ashwini Sehgal et al., How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance Directives
Followed?, 267 JAMA 59, 60 (1992).
128. Id. at 61. "Sixty percent of subjects with prior written directives wanted advance directives
followed strictly in our scenarios. By contrast, 33% of subjects without prior written directives wanted
advance directives followed strictly .... Id. People with histories of other serious illness (cancer or
stroke) were particularly unlikely to want their advance directives strictly followed. Id. For reflections
on this problem, see Dan W. Brock, Trumping Advance Directives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct.
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make their own medical decisions as is supposed, would they not more
eagerly seize the opportunity to make advance directives, and would they not
more consistently oppose meddling with directives they had made?
Another behavioral datum likewise hints that patients hesitate about taking
control of medical decisions. One might suppose that if patients were ever to
assert their decisional authority, it would be after hearing the alarming
fecitation of risks that characterizes the process of informed consent. Yet a
number of studies of that process "strongly suggest that refusals attributable
to disclosures are rarely, if ever, seen."1 29 Similarly, a study of why patients
30
refuse treatment found an average of 4.6 refusals per 100 patient days.
The reasons for refusal were complex, and generally there was more than one
"cause" per patient. But two kinds of reasons stood out: first, a failure to tell
the patient about the purpose of what was proposed; second, psychological
factors, prominently including "characterological factors" (for example, using
a refusal to accept treatment as a way of expressing a wish to be cared for)
and "other psychoses." While the first of these causes reconfirms the wish for
information we have so frequently encountered, neither of them is inconsistent
with a reluctance to take control of medical decisions. 3 ' And the dog that
did not bark in the night is the absence of any significant number of patients
who hdard
a doctor's recommendation and reached a different decision on the
32
merits.1

Yet another piece of evidence about the reluctance of some patients to
assume the reins of medical command comes from my own research. The
doctors I have so far interviewed-and I hasten to say my interviews are far
from complete and can hardly claim to be either fully representative or
systematic-agree emphatically that a significant number of patients do not
want to make their own medical decisions. 33 To be sure, these doctors may

1991, at 55.
129. Faden et al., supra note 100, at 732. Similarly, "the empirical and anecdotal studies of patients
who refuse treatment almost never portray the process of obtaining informed consent as playing a
causative role." APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 202.
130. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in MedicalHospitals,250
JAMA 1296, 1297 (1983). The Harris Report observes that 79% of all those surveyed reported that they
had never refused treatment a doctor recommended. The report does not reveal what kind of treatment
the other 71% refused or why they refused it. 3 President's Comm., supra note 58, at 184 app. B.
131. As Sherlock puts the point, "[e]ven when patients refuse recommended treatment, they do so
usually not for elaborate reasons of religious or moral principle but most often because they have lost
the trust essential for care, i.e., they do not believe the physician or the staff cares for them and they
can no longer entrust their care to these persons." Richard Sherlock, ReasonableMen and Sick Human
Beings, 80 AM. J. MED. 2, 3 (1986). Perhaps the widespread phenomenon of patient "non-compliance"
represents a kind of passive resistance to the doctor's making of medical decisions. I suspect, however,
that it at least represents a good deal more as well.
132. Of course, there are good reasons not to expect massive patient refusals after being given
"informed consent." Informed consent often comes rather late in the decision-making process, doctors
often do not take it as seriously as courts wish, doctors can frame information to make the recommended
choice relatively attractive, and so on. But the virtual absence of patient refusals at that point is too
complete a phenomenon to be accounted for just in terms of the defects of informed consent.
133. Katz (disapprovingly) quotes Richard Seizer in a somewhat hyperbolic version of such
physicians' reports: "When I try to call the patient in on a consultation and say, 'Which alternative
would you prefer?' invariably the patient says, 'What do you mean, which alternative? I want you to
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have their own reasons for believing and saying that patients want to cede
them authority, and they are guided by their own cultural preconceptions when
they interpret what patients do and say. But I am as reluctant to dismiss their
evidence entirely on those grounds as I am to dismiss the assertions of
bioethicists and lawyers because of their own considerable stakes-economic,
social, and intellectual-in the issues they debate. And, to be sure, doctors
have notorious difficulty assessing their patients' desire to make medical
decisions.134 But doctors have a unique and rich perspective and experience
too valuable to be lost and too direct to be dismissed out of hand. Thus, I
believe that the testimony of these doctors is at least relevant as confirmation
of what the other sources I have reviewed indicate.
A final confirmation of my thesis-anecdotal but illuminating-comes from
the memoirs of the sick and of the families who have cared for them. Some
of these memoirists complain of being deprived of decisional authority.'35
But a number-I would say a preponderance-of these extensive and intensive
accounts of sickness conspicuously fail to make that complaint.'36 The selfconscious and articulate folk who write these memoirs are exactly the people
one would think likeliest to want such authority and to notice and criticize its
absence. They are certainly willing to express their unhappiness, even their
bitterness, with other medical deficiencies. But their grievances have most
conspicuously to do not with being deprived of authority, but with medical
errors, with doctors' lack of sympathy and understanding, with lack of
information, with the insolence and inefficiencies of medical bureaucracy, and
with doctors who were not there to attend to the case. (And, it should be said,
these same memoirists often volunteer appreciation and even enthusiasm for
doctors who were conscientious, kind, and competent.)
This anecdotal evidence finds some (rather tangential) substantiation in two
kinds of empirical data. The first kind lies in studies of what causes
dissatisfied patients to sue their physicians. One such study found that "while
the current trend in medicine stresses the importance of treating patients as

tell me what to do. You're the doctor."' KATZ, supra note 7, at 126 (quoting F. Middleton, Profile:
Richard Seizer, NEW HAVEN MAG., July 1983, at 37).
134. See, e.g., Strull et al., supra note 90, at 2992.
135. See, e.g., MARTHA WEINMAN LEAR, HEARTSOUNDS (1980); ANDREw H. MALCOLM, SOMEDAY:
THE STORY OF A MOTHER AND HER SON (1991); CORNELIUS RYAN & KATHRYN MORGAN RYAN, A

PRIVATE BATTLE (1979). Cornelius Ryan, the author of several books on World War II battles, resolved
to research his disease in the same way that he researched those battles. Malcolm's book is an argument
in favor of allowing patients more control of the decision to end treatment necessary to keep them alive.
Lear's husband died of heart disease. With Ryan he is the patient in these memoirs most anxious to
control his own treatment. Notably, he was also a physician. Lear herself, however, exclaims at one
point of a conversation with one of her husband's doctors, "Damn, don't give me options. Give me
guidance." LEAR, supra at 291.
136. E.g., ANATOLE BROYARD, INTOXICATED BY MY ILLNESS, AND OTHER WRITINGS ON LIFE AND
DEATH (1992); ARTHUR W. FRANK, AT THE WILL OF THE BODY (1991); MOLLY HASKELL, LOVE AND

OTHER INFECTIOUS DISEASES: A MEMOIR (1990); BERNICE KAVINOKY, VOYAGE AND RETURN (1966);
MADELEINE L'ENGLE, TwO-PART INVENTION: THE STORY OF A MARRIAGE (1988); FITzHUGH MULLAN,
VITAL SIGNS: A YOUNG DOCTOR'S STRUGGLE WITH CANCER (1983); ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BODY
SILENT (1990); PHILIP ROTH, PATRIMONY: A TRUE STORY (1991); OLIVER SACKS, A LEG TO STAND

ON (1987); BARBARA D. WEBSTER, ALL OF A PIECE: A LIFE WITH MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS (1989).
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active participants in the delivery of medical services, such considerations
may have few consequences for disputing. At bottom, only the doctor's
perceived competence and attention to the patient's health appear to influence
the decision to sue."'13 7 The second kind of support for the conclusion I have
drawn from patients' and families' memoirs comes from studies of patient
satisfaction. These studies commonly conclude that patients are generally
satisfied with the care they receive from their own physicians (even if they
are not so content with doctors en masse) and with their degree of participation in medical decisions.' 38
In sum, not only does the survey literature strongly suggest that a
significant number of people do not yearn to make their own medical
decisions, but that literature is substantiated-sometimes obliquely, sometimes
directly-by a variety of other kinds of evidence. But one other point about
this body of evidence needs to be recognized. There is reason to think that the
graver the decision, the less likely the patient may be (other things being
equal) to want to address it. There is, in other words, evidence that the more
severe the patient's illness, the less likely the patient is to want to make
medical decisions.'39 This is plausible enough, since the sicker a patient is,
the less energy and capacity the patient is likely to feel. If this is true, it is
important, since it means that the most consequential decisions will often be
exactly those the patient is the least inclined to make.
Similarly, as we have seen, there is fairly consistent evidence that the older
patients are, the less likely they are to want to make their own decisions. This
is also important, and for much the same reason: those patients who are
likeliest to have serious medical problems and to be making life-and-death
decisions are least likely to relish making their own decisions. Thus, the
survey data may even understate the extent to which actual patients with
serious decisions to make want to exercise their autonomy.

137. Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors?How PatientsHandle Medical
Grievances, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 105, 116 (1990). Their results "tentatively suggest that patients are

not affected by many of the procedural niceties of these efforts [to improve communication between
doctor and patient]: involving the patient as partner, informing the patient about care, not rushing the
patient's visit, and taking personal care about the patient's medical problem." Id. at 118.
138. As the President's Commission noted, its survey found that "only 7% of the public reports
dissatisfaction with their doctors' respect for their treatment preferences." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT

IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP, VOLUME ONE: REPORT 46 (U.S. G.P.O. 1982). To like
effect, see, e.g., Mark & Spiro, supra note 105, at 778; William M. Strull et al., Do Patients Want to
Participatein Medical Decision Making?, 252 JAMA 2990, 2993 (1984).
139. Ende et al., supra note 86, at 26-27; Harris & Associates, supra note 120, at 17; Sutherland et
al., supra note 114, at 260. Similarly, another study found that patients "who preferred leaving decisions
to the physician had a lower performance status, i.e., in bed more than half of the day or totally bedridden, than those who preferred to participate in decisions ....
Blanchard et al., supra note 119, at
1142. And it is highly suggestive that older people, who have generally had more experience with
serious illness than young people, are also likelier to wish to defer their medical decisions to someone
else. See, e.g., Cassileth et al., supra note 116. It is also suggestive that people with histories of serious
illness were particularly unlikely to be anxious that their advance directives be strictly followed. But cf.
Degner & Sloan, supra note I11, at 947 (finding that symptom-distress levels were not related to
patients' preferences about decisions).
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The evidence I have been summarizing is highly suggestive but hardly
unequivocal. The studies I have reviewed differ markedly in their quality, in
their range, in their goals, in their sites, in their patient populations, in their
techniques, in their results, and in their conclusions. Taken as a whole, the
evidence I have amassed leaves many questions unanswered. It resembles the
few, damaged, and scattered stones in an ancient mosaic discovered by an
archeologist. They establish convincingly enough the subject of the picture;
but they leave its details uncertain.
This evidence, for instance, indicates quite clearly that most patients believe
they want "information." But it hardly tells us which kinds of information
patients want, how much of it they want, when they want it, why they want
it, when they might not want it, or what they might do with it. For example,
in my own research I interviewed one patient who distinctly wanted to be kept
informed of what was going to happen next, but did not want to be told until
right before it was going to happen, since he did not want to dwell on
possibly unpleasant information that he did not immediately need. Many other
patients I have talked with seem much more anxious for information that will
be helpful in handling day-to-day problems than in hardcore medical
information. And so on.
In addition, the evidence I have reviewed tells us that many, but not all, and
perhaps not even most, patients are reluctant to assume full decisional power.
But much remains unclear. That patients do not want full power does not
mean that they want none. It seems likely, for instance, that even patients who
wish to yield authority to make most decisions wish to retain residual
authority to countermand particularly troublesome ones. It is at least apparent
that patients do want a good deal of information, and information permits
patients to oversee their treatment to some extent and to intervene in it if they
so choose.
That patients want to cede some of their authority does not tell us to whom
they wish to cede it. It seems likely, for example, that some patients want to
accord some of their authority not to their doctors but rather to their families.
I have encountered a number of examples of this in my research. Quite often,
one will see elderly but competent parents who have effectively delegated
authority to make medical decisions to their middle-aged children. And not
infrequently one encounters similar delegations one spouse has made to the

other. 140
Further, that patients do not relish making "medical" decisions does not
mean that they are similarly reluctant to make social or moral decisions raised
by their illness. Thus a patient might refuse to make any decision about what
kinds of treatment to receive, but might insist on retaining the power to reject
some treatments as socially impractical or even to reject treatment altogether.

140. For reflections on the role of families in medical decisions, see Jeffrey Blustein, The Family in
MedicalDecisionmaking,HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1993, at 6; Symposium, Ethics, Bioethics,
and FamilyLaw, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 735. For an extended and moving description of the Wvay one son
shared decisional authority with his father, see ROTH, supra note 136.
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In sum, the empirical evidence I have recited raises many provocative issues
and suggests many fascinating questions for future inquiry. That is part of the
attraction of these data and of the empirical method in bioethics. But these
studies seem to me quite strong enough to support at least one telling
conclusion: A significant-and perhaps quite a substantial-number of people
are not hungry to make decisions about their medical problems.
CONCLUSION
No themes are so human as those that reflect for us, out of
confusion of life, the close connexion of bliss and bale, of
things that help with the things that hurt, so dangling before for
ever that bright hard medal, of so strange an alloy, one of
which is somebody's right and ease and the other pain and
wrong.
Henry James
What Maisie Knew
What are we to make of the data I have reviewed? As I hope I need not say,
those data do not show, and are not recruited to show, that autonomy is a
valueless value, that many patients do not want to exercise it in many ways,
or that the law should discard autonomy from its agenda of esteem. But these
data seem to me to exemplify the ways in which empirical research can raise
fruitful questions about the scope, strength, and nature of the autonomy
paradigm. I believe, in other words, that we have at least reached that point
in the Kuhnian progression at which we need to develop and refine the
autonomy paradigm to take into account the world's complexity, to accord
each element of the paradigm a better-gauged place, to accommodate
competing claims and interests. The data I have surveyed raise questions
which will help us in those tasks.
What are some of those questions? First, why do so many patients say they
do not want to make their own medical decisions? Is the autonomy paradigm
correct in tacitly assuming that people in fact, at base, truly do want to make
their own medical decisions? Have the patients who say they do not want to
make medical decisions been seduced into misunderstanding their own
preferences? Have the structure of medicine and the arrogance of doctors
deprived patients of even the will to claim their rightful authority over their
own decisions? Or, on the other hand, can patients have any substantial and
persuasive reasons for wishing to delegate authority over medical decisions
to their doctors, their families, or their friends?
What, to take a more specific example of a useful question, is the
relationship between the common perception that people generally want to
"control" their own lives and the evidence that some patients are not anxious
to make their own medical decisions? Is that perception correct? Is making
one's own medical decisions the best way of asserting control? What do
people mean by control? Is control possible?
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The data I have surveyed should also lead us to ask whether we have
framed our questions properly. Bioethics and the law tend to talk about
medical decisions as though they were sufficiently alike to constitute a single
category. But might we be well advised to disaggregate that category? Are all
the decisions we put in it actually medical decisions, as opposed to moral,
religious, or social decisions? Do patients have any pressing need or technical
competence to make all the choices that are genuinely "medical" decisions?
Can we devise more precise categories of questions to fit the probably wide
range of dilemmas we now describe as "medical questions"?
The data I have surveyed raise yet another greatly important but insufficiently explored question: To what extent are patients morally obliged to
exercise their autonomy whether they want to or not? Patients might
reasonably suggest that they are exercising their autonomy by declining to
make their own medical decisions. But it might plausibly be said in response
that patients have duties-to themselves, to their family and friends, to their
medical attendants-to make their own decisions. It might be argued that
patients will best discharge their duty to maintain their own health by making
their own medical decisions. It might be said that patients should not impose
the moral burdens of consequential decisions on other people, that patients
have a duty to chart their own life course and to shoulder responsibility for
their own welfare.
Finally, these data raise questions about how people who truly do not wish
to make their own medical decisions should be treated. How should such
patients be identified? How can they be distinguished from patients who say
they do not want to make decisions but at some deeper level actually do want
to make them? Should patients be encouraged to make medical decisions?
Educated to make them? Compelled to make them? More broadly, how should
medical decisions be socially structured to take into account the whole range
of patient preferences?
In sum, the empirical data I have reviewed in this Article raise a host of
problematic and pressing issues, issues which will force us to re-examine the
autonomy paradigm and the hyper-rationalist assumptions on which we have
allowed it to rest and to temper and deepen it. The reader is entitled to ask
what kind of empirical evidence we have about those issues, and how they are
best addressed. In a subsequent article, currently titled Toward New
Paradigmsfor Bioethics: Patients, Doctors, Decisions, and the Practiceof
Autonomy, I will soon take on that enterprise.

